

A Japanese Perspective: International Organizations for Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula¹

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From the viewpoint of the theory of international organizations, we may utilize four different perspectives of international relations—namely, the perspective of (a) international systems, (b) of international regimes, (c) of functional approaches, and (d) of political realism. In this paper, I apply these four perspectives to the problems of the Korean Peninsula. The purpose of this paper is to choose perspectives applicable to each international organization concerned. Five notions for peace and security are considered: bilateral negotiation, coordinated security, alliance, cooperative security, and collective security.

A number of multilateral channels in the framework of international organizations are considered: (1) the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), (2) the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), (3) the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), (4) the United Nations, and (5) the framework of multilateral consultation.

Six points were arrived at in conclusion. First, a high priority should be placed on fortifying the framework of Northeast Asian multilateral consultations within the framework of the five international organizations. Second, the legal responsibility of North Korea should be reconfirmed. Third, from an international regime perspective, KEDO and bilateral arrangements, such as the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, the June 2000 Joint South-North Declaration, the 2001 Russia-

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DPRK Moscow Declaration, and the 2002 Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, are extremely important. The accumulation of these international regimes should lead North Korea to join the international society and international systems. Fourth, it is easy for North Korea to have loose ties with functional international organizations.

Fifth, five notions for peace and security are considered: bilateral negotiation, security, coordinated alliance, cooperative security, and collective security. These notions for peace and security are not alternative choices. It is not easy to live peacefully with heterogeneous peoples who have different historical, social, cultural, and economic backgrounds. There is a need for a philosophy to overcome these differences. I therefore propose a cooperative symbiotic security in line with that followed by the Japanese Eastern philosophy study group. Sixth, although it may sound rather ambitious, I would like to see the creation of a supranational organization like the European Union (EU) in the region of Northeast Asia.

Preface

In this paper, I would like to discuss the problem of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea).² I regret that Japan in the past committed crimes as a colonial empire. We of the present generation of Japan cannot escape from this historical responsibility. The Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan have been able to build a friendly relationship since the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1965. And in 2002 the ROK and Japan co-hosted the FIFA World Cup, which helped build a more solid foundation of mutual understanding and exchange. In contrast, there has been no positive relationship between Japan and North Korea since World War II. Maybe the people of North Korea have no sentiment to forgive the facts of the Japanese colonial age.

I. Four Perspectives and Five Notions for Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula

From the viewpoint of the theory of international organizations, we may utilize four different perspectives of international relations—namely, (a) the perspective of international system, (b) the perspective of international regime, (c) the perspective of functional approach, and (d) the perspective of political realism. In this paper, I would like to apply all of these four perspectives to the problems of the Korean Peninsula. The purpose of this paper is to choose perspectives applicable to each international organization concerned. Therefore, I do not choose any one of these perspectives for precise analysis.

The definition of international system can center upon the group of actors interacting within the system's structure by recognizable processes and subject to various constraints, or on the various processes of interaction. The theory of system is applicable to many scientific disciplines, not only social science but also natural science. At this point, let me quote from Joseph Frankel: "The many definitions do not deviate from the general systems theory which defines 'systems' as anything formed of parts placed together or adjusted into a regular and connected whole; an assemblage of bodies as a connected whole."³ There is an obstacle in applying the perspective of international system in the analysis of the problem of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. Because North Korea is virtually closed to the outside (a closed-door policy), there is little room for any international system to include North Korea with other countries. North Korea is placed outside of most international systems. As Hanai mentioned, it is the weak point of the perspective of international system that it cannot apply to analysis of the relationship between different systems.⁴ Hoffman also stated that "it is obvious that their [international systems] effectiveness depends on the degree of

moderation of the international system. A revolutionary system wracked by inexorable power rivalries and ideological conflicts is one in which international organization is reduced to importance as a force of its own and to the condition of a helpless stake in the competition of states.”⁵

International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which the actors’ expectations converge in a given issue-area, as Krasner noted.⁶ The following two conditions are required for the international regime to be effective, but there is little international regime that is effective between North Korea and other countries. First, a regime is effective to the extent that its members abide by its norms and rules. Second, a regime is effective to the extent that it achieves certain objectives or fulfills certain purposes.⁷ As noted in the following chapter, there are few international regimes between North Korea and the surrounding states. And the possibility of applying a perspective of international regime is examined.

The perspective of political realism in this paper examines the perspective in terms of the theory of balance of power. Morgenthau explains, “International Politics, like all politics, power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself.”⁸ This perspective of political realism is based on power politics among nation-states. Morgenthau states, “The aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying either to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of power and to policies that aim at preserving it.”⁹ This perception of Morgenthau on international relations is of struggle for power by each nation like the Machiavellian world. The perspective of political realism is a traditional approach of the theory of international relations, but the relationship between North Korea and the surrounding states is on the primitive stage of the Machiavellian world.

The functional approach is one of the traditional theories of international relations. According to Morgenthau, “not every

action that a nation performs with respect to another nation is of a political nature. Many such activities are normally undertaken without any consideration of power, nor do they normally affect the power of the nation undertaking them. Many legal, economic, humanitarian, and cultural activities are of this kind.”¹⁰ As Mitrany explained, functional “neutrality” is possible, where political “neutrality” is not.¹¹ The functional approach tries to create a functional community mainly in the field of economic and social activities that are apart from political fields. It must be easier to set up an international organization restricted to the field of social and economic activities and apart from political troubles from the start. Also, as Frankel explains, “Functionalism constitutes more than a theory; it is, in fact, a philosophy based upon attempts to eliminate frictions inherent in interstate relations, including war, either by concentrating upon the economic and social welfare of the people of the world, and ignoring State boundaries or by setting up international organizations devoted to the various activities and functions arising from the satisfaction of man’s socio-economic needs.”¹²

Furthermore, in this paper, five notions for peace and security are considered: that is, bilateral negotiation, coordinated security, alliance, cooperative security, and collective security. These notions are studied in the following chapters in the context of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

II. Bilateral Channels: Negotiation Between Japan and the DPRK

The bilateral channel, negotiation between Japan and the DPRK, has both merits and demerits. The two countries can negotiate directly without intervention by any third party, but the negotiation is based on persuasion and consent with functional attitude. If both sides are only to argue their self-assertion to seek each other’s power, the negotiation will break down.

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Chairman Kim Jong-Il of the DPRK National Defense Commission met and had talks in Pyongyang and signed the Pyongyang Declaration on 17 September 2002. In this declaration, Japan and the DPRK confirmed that they would cooperate with each other in order to maintain and strengthen the peace and stability of Northeast Asia. There are two aspects of the relationship between Japan and the DPRK. One is the problem of security, and the other is that of human rights. Both sides insist on their demands and would not come to compromise. The following facts are the main problems of the relationship between the DPRK and Japan.

1. The Problem of Human Rights

(1) The abduction issue

Since the 1970s, unidentified ships of North Korea have abducted many Japanese individuals. After the Pyongyang Declaration on 17 September 2002, five abductees returned from North Korea to Japan. But there remain two problems. First, there is the problem of the families of the five abductees. The Japanese government emphasized that it was important that the families of the five abductees should be provided with an environment in which they could make free decisions and requested the securing of their safety and prompt return. Second, the other abductees are still missing. The Japanese government demanded that North Korea should investigate fully the circumstances and the current status of the other abductees.

(2) North Koreans in Japan problem

In Japan, there are about 636,000 Japanese Koreans. They include North Koreans and South Koreans. There is also a North Korean university in Japan and North Korean banks. In the human dimension, there are many ways to communicate with North Korea.

Unfortunately, however, on account of a series of collapses of North Korean-affiliated financial institutions, Japanese investigative authorities conducted a formal search of the

headquarters of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan in November 2002. Strong responses emerged from the North Korean government, which criticized Japan's policy. After the above incident, North Korea suspended their efforts of investigation for the still missing persons who are suspected of having been abducted. The problem of North Korean-affiliated financial institutions has not been resolved yet.

2. *Security Issue*

(1) **Nuclear and missile issues**

The Japanese government has emphasized that North Korea should observe the Pyongyang Declaration, which stated that “for an overall resolution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula, they would comply with all related international agreements.” Japan strongly requested the following three points:

- (a) Clarification of the content of the program to enrich uranium;
- (b) specific measures for the resolution of the issues—in other words, dismantling this program in a prompt and verifiable manner; and
- (c) to maintain the freezing of the facilities based on the Agreed Framework and the swift acceptance of inspections to ensure full compliance by North Korea with the Safeguards Agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

North Korea possesses the Nodong missiles; and Japan is situated within the range of these missiles. The existence of the Nodong missiles is a threat to the peace and security not only of Japan but also of the Korean Peninsula. The Japanese strongly requested that these missiles be scrapped. On 24 April 2003, North Korea admitted having at least one nuclear bomb. This is a serious threat to Japan.

North Korea responded that the cause of the tension on the Korean Peninsula was the hostile policy of the United States. North Korea first wishes to consult with the United States. If

the hostile policy of the United States is changed, North Korea will be able to negotiate with Japan about peace and security in this area. Bilateral negotiation between North Korea and Japan on the security issue could not find the way to open for the time being.

(2) **The problem of operation ships**

In December 2001, an unidentified ship appeared in the waters of the southwest sea off the coast of Kyushu (one of the areas of Japanese coastline). The Japan Coast Guard gave the ship warning to get out of Japanese territorial waters, but no response was received. Finally the unidentified ship was sunk. Later the ship was revealed to be a North Korean special task force ship.

Both the human rights issue and the security issue have political as well as functional aspects. At this stage, there are little functional aspects of cooperation between North Korea and Japan. Both countries seek their powers and benefits in terms of power politics. As mentioned earlier, the factor of the United States is very important for the relationship between Japan and the DPRK. If the United States does not change its hostile policy, the problem of the relationship between Japan and North Korea will be very difficult to resolve. Thus, the Japanese government cannot rely only on the bilateral channel of negotiation. In contrast, Hang Chang On, a noted North Korea researcher, observes that the accumulation of bilateral relationships, such as the June 2000 Joint South-North Declaration, the 2001 Russia-DPRK Moscow Declaration, and the 2002 Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, will lead North Korea to join regional cooperation.¹³ As Prof. Izumi believes, it is necessary to reconfirm that an important role Japan can play for détente on the Korean Peninsula is to induce North Korea to fulfill steadily its engagement of the 17 September 2002 “Pyongyang Declaration.”¹⁴ The Japanese government should try some kind of multilateral channel. From the viewpoint of international organizations, it might be better to seek a multilateral solution rather than a bilateral solution for the problems between Japan and North Korea.

III. Multilateral Channel: The Framework of International Organizations

Broadly speaking, five multilateral channels should be considered: (1) the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), (2) the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), (3) the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), (4) the United Nations (UN), and (5) the framework of multilateral consultation.

1. The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG)

The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) seems to be an alliance of international security. On 7 January 2003, the TCOG—three delegations of the United States, Republic of Korea, and Japan—called on North Korea to terminate its nuclear weapons development program, which constitutes a violation of North Korea's international commitments. These three delegations reaffirmed that further close consultations and coordination among the three countries remain vital in addressing this very serious issue. There are two meanings that the TCOG has.

First, the hostile attitude of the U.S. has been mitigated substantially. In the TCOG Joint Press Statement on 7 January 2003, the U.S. delegation reiterated President George W. Bush's statement that the United States poses no threat to North Korea and has no intention of invading North Korea. The ROK and Japanese delegations reassured their strong welcome in a statement endorsing the intention of the U.S. The U.S. delegation explained that the U.S. was willing to talk to North Korea about how it would meet its obligations to the international community. In the statement, the U.S. accepted the request of North Korea of first wishing to consult with the U.S. However, in the same statement, the U.S. delegation stressed that the U.S. will not provide quid pro quos to North Korea to live up to its existing obligations. From the

standpoint of the U.S., it cannot provide any development aid to North Korea for fear that other developing countries might imitate North Korea in developing nuclear programs in order to get development aid.

Second, the TCOG is a kind of foreign security alliance. Members of this type of competitive alliance perceive that their success in realizing goals is dependent on their relative strength vis-à-vis each other. Members of the alliance would “seek to (1) prevent their own members from leaving the coalition, (2) encourage members of rival coalitions to leave theirs, (3) prevent nonaligned states from joining a rival coalition, and (4) encourage nonaligned states to join theirs.”¹⁵ In the context of the problems of the Korean Peninsula, there is no balance of power between the TCOG and North Korea. A classical design of the balance of power between one alliance and the other alliance cannot be applicable to this case. The position of North Korea is a single nonaligned state. Zacher notes that nonaligned states will be reluctant to take sides in security conflicts between members of rival major coalitions. In the case of North Korea, however, this aligned-nonaligned relationship, where the nonaligned state takes a weak position, cannot be applicable to the normal theory of the alliance. Certainly the TCOG must be a huge pressure power against North Korea. The firmer the TCOG is aligned, the stiffer the attitude of North Korea becomes. It is a relationship like the traveler and the north wind in the Aesop fable.

2. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is a loose and communicative tie among member states. The notion of cooperative security can be applied to the organization of the ARF. As Evans noted, “Cooperative security has been usefully described as a broad approach to security which is multi-dimensional in scope and gradualist in temperament; emphasizing reassurance rather than deterrence; is inclusive rather than exclusive; is not restrictive in membership; favours multilateralism over bilateralism; does not privilege military

solutions over non-military ones; assumes that states are the principal actors in the security system, but accepts that non-state actors may have an important role to play; does not require the creation of formal security institutions, but does not reject them either; and above all, stresses value of creating “habits of dialogue” on a multilateral basis.”¹⁶ (Evans, 1993, p.16.) Mainly, the ARF furnishes the mechanism for creating “habits of dialogue” on a multilateral basis. The ARF takes a gradual evolutionary approach in the following three stages, Stage I: Promotion of confidence-building measures (CBMs); Stage II: development of preventive diplomacy; and Stage III: development of a conflict-resolution mechanism. At this time, there is no concrete mechanism of CBMs, preventive diplomacy, and peacekeeping, but there is culture of dialogue about these three stages.

On the one hand, the ARF has some possibility to solve the problem of the Korean Peninsula.

First, North Korea has been a member of the ARF since July 2000, and North Korea expressed its presence at a ministerial-level conference of the ARF held in June 2003 in Phnom Penh.¹⁷ From the perspective of international system, North Korea can be analyzed as one of the actors in the same international system as the ARF.

Second, through many seminars, workshops, meetings and training courses, there appears weak but developing international regimes in the ARF region.¹⁸ These seminars, workshops, meetings and training courses are not substantive enactment but common perceptive for the regimes of CBMs and preventive diplomacy are being gradually cultivated.

Third, it is functional aspect for the peace and security to convene above mentioned seminars, workshops, meetings and training courses, although it would take too much time to construct any concrete organization like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

On the other hand, there are two problems that do not necessarily make the ARF suitable for solution of the problem on the Korean Peninsula.

First, the ARF is too large as an organization to concentrate on the problem of the Korean Peninsula. The ARF is composed of 22 member states and the European Union (EU). Therefore, the ARF is composed to manage ASEAN problems mainly. It is unlikely to concentrate on dealing with the problems of North Korea intensively.

Second, at this stage, the mechanism of the ARF is too loose for ensuring peace and security. Although the ARF has held many seminars, meetings, and training programs related to CBMs and preventive diplomacy since its inception, it does not have any organized mechanism for implementing concrete measures for preventive diplomacy or peacekeeping.

3. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) aims at a political change in the mind of North Korea through a functional approach.

In October 1994 the United States and North Korea signed a historic agreement on an Agreed Framework. Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to freeze and ultimately dismantle its nuclear program. In return, the United States agreed to finance the country and construct two light-water reactors there and to provide it with an alternative source of energy in the form of heavy fuel oil for heating and electricity production until the first of these reactors is completed.

In support of these goals, KEDO was established on 15 March 1995, when Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the U.S. expressed their common desire to implement the key provisions of the Agreed Framework and signed the Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization.

After North Korean acknowledgement of having a programme to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons on 16 October 2002, the KEDO Board decided to suspend heavy oil deliveries as of the December shipment under the Agreed

Framework, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the DPRK-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and so on.

In this context, there are two kinds of international regime. One is the Agreed Framework, and the other is the Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. It is a distinctive feature of the former that this international regime, the Agreed Framework, includes North Korea. There is little international regime including North Korea in connection with the surrounding states.

The Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization does not include North Korea. While KEDO has 13 member states, the U.S., ROK, and Japan are the founding members and constitute the organization's Executive Board; the other 10 members support the purpose of KEDO and offer assistance, such as providing funds, goods, or services. From the perspective of functional approach, it is important for KEDO to be composed of many members, so that, in an emergency, many member countries will be able to help the North Korean people with respect to peaceful energy supply, such as heavy fuel oil for heating and electricity production. In this aspect, the notion of cooperative security is applicable to the cooperation. From the perspective of international system, the Agreed Framework can be placed in the subsystem of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. The latter does not include North Korea directly, but through the Agreed Framework it can involve North Korea.

From the perspective of political realism, there is no balance of power between the U.S. and North Korea. For the sake of a balance of power, North Korea does not give up its nuclear development program with nuclear weapons. One Japanese diplomat said, "In the light of the country's economic hardships and its desire to overcome its inferiority in its military strength, I cannot imagine that it will abandon nuclear development as a diplomatic card."¹⁹ The Japanese government has a pessimistic view of North Korea abandoning its nuclear

development. But in contrast, one ROK bureaucrat said, “We will develop a circumstance where Pyongyang can feel safe and does not have to cling to nuclear weapons. After all, that is the only way to lead North Korea to abandon its nuclear development.”²⁰ Maybe the opinion of the latter must be constructive, and it constitutes a functional approach.

4. United Nations

There are two aspects of the relationship between the UN agencies and North Korea.

The first aspect is the relationship between North Korea and the World Food Program (WFP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the World Health Organization (WHO).

The DPRK has faced severe economic crisis in recent years. After the Cold War, social and economic relations with the former Soviet Union and East European countries were terminated. The DPRK needs emergency humanitarian aid of food and health services. The UN agencies, such as the WFP, UNICEF, and WHO, have been operating actively to supply food or support health programs.

The WHO established an office in Pyongyang in November 1997, providing technical advisory capacity as part of humanitarian assistance and supporting health programs, such as control of tuberculosis and surveillance and control of communicable diseases.²¹

UNICEF has a field office in North Korea. On 12 March 2003, Mehr Khan, UNICEF’s regional director for East Asia and the Pacific, warned that the dramatic drop in the level of funding for humanitarian assistance for the DPRK may soon leave clinics without medicine and supplies—wiping out recent hard-won gains in child health care.²²

Since 1995, the WFP has distributed a total of 2 million metric tons of food aid worth \$500 million, and there is consensus that the program’s work has prevented wide-scale food shortages. The WFP has many offices in North Korea. Its country office is located in Pyongyang. There are many field

offices inside North Korea, such as Chongjin, Hyesan, Hamhung, Sinuiju, and Wonsan.²³

In spite of North Korea's closed-door policy, UN agencies have many offices within its borders. For these UN agencies, North Korea is placed in the same international system like most of the member states of the UN. From the perspective of international system, North Korea is one of the actors in the international system of the UN. Furthermore, North Korea is a member of the WHO Charter and the UN Charter. North Korea and the other member states of the WHO and the UN join the same legal order as well as the same international regime. North Korea ought to have legal responsibility in the UN Charter and the WHO Charter. And it is a functional approach that these UN agencies have taken toward North Korea. From a functional approach, food supply and health services are basic human needs for the people of North Korea. Maurice Strong, Secretary-General Kofi Annan's special adviser, returning from a visit to North Korea in January 2003, noted that the most urgent issue was the humanitarian issue and humanitarian supplies were moving again. He continued that on the issue of longer-term development, it was impossible to divorce peace and security from the country's economic security. According to his report, North Korea has been undertaking some reform and has been trying to prepare itself by seeking the international community's cooperation in terms of economic development.²⁴ From the perspective of functional approach, there begins to emerge a gradual though loose, functional community in the field of socio-economic needs apart from the field of political trouble. I should add that the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted resolutions expressing deep concern with human rights violations in the DPRK. The Commission expressed deep concern at the "precarious" human rights situation in the DPRK, characterized by "wide spread" abuses, such as torture and public executions, as well as "all-pervasive and severe" restrictions on freedom of thought and expression.²⁵ The purpose of the UN activities is to help the people of North Korea, not the government of the

DPRK. The functional approach of the above-mentioned UN agencies should be understood in the context of human security.

The second aspect is the relationship between North Korea and the UN bodies that are in charge of peace and security, that is, the United Nations Security Council, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Fundamentally, the United Nations is the international organization of collective security: “The Organizing principle of collective security is the respect for the moral and legal obligation to consider an attack by any nation upon any member of the alliance as an attack upon all members of the alliance. Consequently, collective security is supposed to operate automatically; that is, aggression calls the counter alliance into operation at once and, therefore, protects peace and security with the greatest possible efficiency.”²⁶ In the UN Charter, the principle of collective security is reflected in Chapter VII. And the UN Security Council is in charge of collective security.²⁷ This fundamental principle can, of course, apply to the case of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea, which is a member of the UN, has the obligation to observe its rules.

North Korea was a member of the IAEA from 1974 until 13 June 1994. In the meantime, on 12 December 1985, North Korea became a party to the NPT. On 10 April 1992, the NPT Safeguards Agreement entered into force. After North Korea submitted its initial report to the IAEA under the Safeguards Agreement in May 1992, inspections began. Thus, North Korea was a member of the IAEA-NPT regime.

But on 13 June 1994, North Korea withdrew its membership from the IAEA. From the perspective of international system, North Korea had not been an actor of the IAEA system. However, it had kept member status of the NPT Safeguards Agreement. Thus, the IAEA had taken the view that the withdrawal from the IAEA did not affect North Korea obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. In contrast, North Korea took the position that it was in a special position with regard

to the Safeguards Agreement and that it was no longer obliged to allow inspectors to carry out their work under the Safeguards Agreement.²⁸ At that time, because North Korea did not withdraw from the NPT Safeguards Agreement, any special status could not be recognized. It should be understood that North Korea was placed inside the IAEA-NPT regime from the viewpoint of international regime.

On 16 October 2002, Assistant Secretary Janes Kelly of the U.S. announced that North Korea had acknowledged that it had a programme to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. On 29 November, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution urging the DPRK to cooperate with the IAEA with the view to opening immediately all relevant facilities to IAEA inspection and safeguards, as required under its comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.²⁹ But North Korea has rejected the resolution in familiar terms, attributing the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula to the hostile policy of the U.S. toward it. North Korea does not clarify reports of its having an undeclared uranium enrichment programme, nor has it responded to the IAEA director general's invitation of 18 October for high-level talks in Vienna or North Korea.³⁰ DPRK officials confirmed directly to the inspectors of the IAEA that they should leave the country immediately and that the DPRK has decided not to respond to the IAEA director general's letter urging them to allow the inspectors to remain at the Nyongbyong nuclear site. The inspectors were scheduled to depart from the DPRK on 31 December.³¹ On 10 January 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT effective as of 11 January 2003. The UN secretary-general regretted the pullout decision, the IAEA urged Pyongyang to reconsider, and the Security Council was notified of the withdrawal.³² At last, North Korea now stands outside the international systems of both the IAEA and the NPT. Once North Korea is left out of both international systems, it is the weak point of the perspective of international system that cannot apply to analyze the relationship between different systems. The withdrawal of North Korea affects the effectiveness

of the IAEA-NPT regime, because a regime is effective only to the extent that its members abide by its norms and rules.

There is no way without dealing with the North Korea problem in the UN Security Council. For the time being (as of April 2003), North Korea is a member state of the UN. From the perspective of international system, the UN includes North Korea. The UN Security Council has had the authority to deal with the problem of North Korea's nuclear program. On 9 April, the Security Council held talks on the DPRK nuclear issue and expressed concern, and the council will continue to follow up developments on this matter.³³ On 24 April, discussions were held between U.S. and North Korean diplomats in Beijing. In the discussions, North Korea reportedly warned that it had already developed nuclear weapons and threatened to conduct a "physical demonstration" of its capability.³⁴ From the viewpoint of collective security, it must be a matter of "threat to the peace" in Chapter VII of the UN Charter that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. And it must be better for the U.S. not to hold the problem solely in its hands as it does on the problem of Iraq, but to bring this matter to the UN Security Council. If North Korea takes the posture of threatening by nuclear weapons, there is the possibility for a collective measure prescribed in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The UN has two possibilities. One is to initiate a collective measure. The other is, as Maurice Strong reported, to help the long-term development of North Korea, which requires cooperation at the international level, because North Korea also showed that it wanted to move out into the international community.³⁵

5. The Framework of Multilateral Consultation; Mechanism for Coordinated Security

A number of scholars and politicians have proposed that it is important to construct a framework of a multilateral consultation.³⁶ But for the present, neither a framework of multilateral consultation nor a regional international organization exists in

the region of Northeast Asia. Consequently, there are no international regimes or international systems dealing with the region.

There are some reasons why there is no regional international organization. First, the diverse nature and discontinuity of socio-economic systems existing across countries in this region is the basic reason for the immaturity of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia.³⁷ Second, in this region, three big powers, i.e., Japan, China, and Russia, hold major influence, and including the ROK and North Korea; these big powers deploy a power game. Third, there is no lingua franca, while ASEAN countries share a common language of English.³⁸

There are two approaches to the framework of multilateral consultation. First, from a perspective of a political realist, it is important to hold multilateral consultation for the purpose of resolving the specific problem of the nuclear program in North Korea. This approach tries to focus on the most imminent problem of the nuclear program in North Korea and to organize an international pressure group vis-à-vis North Korea among five states; the U.S., ROK, China, Russia, and Japan. It is a power game between North Korea and the surrounding states. The focal point is who wins the power. The basic foundation of this approach is the relationship between the U.S. and North Korea. But there are limitations to a bilateral solution, because there is the possibility of ending up with a chicken game between them. Perceptions of interdependency and complementarities are needed among one another's power in these six countries. For the purpose of overcoming the limitations of a bilateral solution, the framework of multilateral consultation is needed. But this type of framework cannot be called a cooperative security. There is little cooperation between North Korea and the other five countries. As the first step, there should be needed coordination rather than cooperation for peace and security. While "coordination" means "to place or class in the same order, rank, etc.," "cooperation" means "an act or instance of working or acting together for a common purpose."³⁹ The problem of peace and security on the

Korean Peninsula should begin with having North Korea sitting down at the same table with the other five states. At this stage, I would like to say “coordinated security” is needed first.

Second, from the perspective of a functional approach, it is necessary to coordinate social, economic, and cultural developments of all the regional countries in Northeast Asia. Eight countries are conceived in this regional cooperation as member states, i.e., ROK, North Korea, China, Russia, Mongolia, Canada, U.S., and Japan. As I mentioned before, the functional approach tries to create a functional community mainly in the field of economic and social activities that are apart from political fields. It must be easier to set up a regional international organization restricted to the field of social and economic activities, apart from political troubles from the start. In this functional aspect, the notion of cooperative security is applicable to the cooperation. McDonnell points out that it is important for the region of Northeast Asia to group at a sub-regional level focusing on the process of promoting cooperation and confidence-building measures. And she proposes that for Northeast Asian countries, it should be clearly expressed that the purpose of a regional cooperation organization is not to pose a threat to another country but to tackle common problems for these countries, such as the problems of immigration, policy for resources of water, environment, wood, minerals, farm products, public sanitary policy, or programs on HIV-AIDs or population and utilization of information technology.⁴⁰

There are mainly three merits to the functional approach for the framework of multilateral cooperation.

First, the economic destitution of North Korea should be improved. It is not the problem to be shouldered by ROK solely. To promote a multilateral framework, the economic development of North Korea should be supported and assisted by all the members of the multilateral framework together.

Second, human resources in Northeast Asia should be developed. The population in Japan is now decreasing. On the one hand, Japan needs human resources; on the other hand, China

has the problem of an explosive increase in population.

Third, the development of Siberia in Russia should be promoted. Siberia has been left behind the development of the European part of Russia centered on Moscow. On account of geographical location, it must be better to cooperate with Northeast Asian countries for the prosperity of Siberia.

From the viewpoint of functional approach, the framework of multilateral cooperation should not necessarily concentrate on the security issue of North Korea. It should seek for the social, economic, and cultural development of all members of the multilateral framework.

I think these two approaches, both the functional approach and political realism, should be linked. In the first stage, the functional approach should be given priority. It must be realistic not to organize a comprehensive multilateral framework but to organize functionally divided regional organizations, such as a Northeast Asia environmental cooperation organization, Northeast Asia energy community, Northeast Asia media network organization, and so forth.⁴¹ And at the start, membership of the multilateral framework is restricted to at most six countries, i.e., North Korea, ROK, Japan, China, Russia, and U.S., because too large an organization, like the ARF, will result in too loose ties. A multilateral framework should be gradually expanded to include Mongolia and Canada.

For the purpose of organizing this multilateral framework, three points should be important from the viewpoint of my discipline, the theory of international organizations. Schermers and Blokker said that international organizations are defined as forms of cooperation founded on an international agreement creating at least one organ with a will of its own, established under international law.⁴²

First, there should be a common purpose among member states. From the viewpoint of international system, North Korea should be included in the same international system as surrounding Northeast Asian countries. Therefore, the first priority should be placed on social, economic, and cultural progress in this region. It must be easier for North Korea to

join such a multilateral framework for functional purposes. Historically, most international organizations began with functional cooperation.

Second, an international regime should be created. We should create an international regime including North Korea. There is no regional international regime in Northeast Asia with North Korea for food supply, health service, and environmental cooperation. An international regime leads to international legal order and international organization.

Third, multilateral consultations should be held constantly and periodically. It is important to urge North Korea to sit down at the same table with others regularly. For creating an international organization, an international conference should develop to a permanent international organ, like the Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN. Periodical multilateral consultation will develop to a regular session of international conference, and then it will lead to a concrete international body.

Conclusion

Six points are concluded from the preceding discussions.

First, a high priority should be placed on fortifying the framework of Northeast Asian multilateral consultation within the frameworks of the five international organizations in this study. The framework of multinational consultation should be utilized not to attack the North Korean government but to help the North Korean people. Not only the ROK but also all other Northeast Asian countries should together cope with the problems of the Korean Peninsula.

Second, the legal responsibility of North Korea should be re-confirmed. It is ambiguous that North Korea is recognized as a state in terms of international law. Recognition of a state is different from recognition of a government. I mean that rather than recognition of the government, recognition of the state is important. The choice of government is a domestic matter of

North Korea. The Japanese government should not intervene in the domestic politics of another country. But recognition of the state is an international matter and fundamental to the international legal order. The state is the entity that is the bearer of international rights and obligations. If there is no recognized state in North Korea, we cannot organize any international organization including North Korea. North Korea does have membership status of the UN Charter. It is recognized as a responsible state under international law in the UN Charter. Also, it has the legal responsibility to maintain international peace and security that is stipulated in Article 1 on the purposes of the United Nations.

Third, from the perspective of international regime, KEDO and bilateral arrangements, such as the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, the June 2000 Joint South-North Declaration, the 2001 Russia-DPRK Moscow Declaration, and the 2002 Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, are very important. Through these arrangements, North Korea is an actor of international regimes. It is ambiguous whether these arrangements amount to an international treaty and have a legally binding force, but the accumulation of these international regimes will lead North Korea to join the international society and international system.

Fourth, it is easier for North Korea to join in loose ties of functional international organizations. From the perspective of international system, North Korea is included only in the UN and ARF, although it was an actor of the IAEA-NPT regime until 11 January 2003. We should seek ways to include North Korea in many kinds of international systems. Maybe there is no other way than a functional approach to make North Korea join in international systems.

Fifth, I propose symbiosis security. Five notions for peace and security are considered; that is, bilateral negotiation, coordinated security, alliance, cooperative security, and collective security. These notions for peace and security are not alternative choices. They should be pursued in parallel simultaneously. A combination of bilateral negotiations should be

developed to build a cooperative security community. Regional alliances should be reorganized as amounting to regional collective security.⁴³ It is not so easy to live peacefully with heterogeneous peoples who have different historical, social, cultural, and economic backgrounds. There is a need for philosophy to overcome these differences. Many scholars in Japan propose a philosophy of symbiosis.⁴⁴ The term “symbiosis” originated from biology. “Symbiosis” is explained as “the living together of two dissimilar organisms, esp. when this association is mutually beneficial,” as defined in the *Random House of College Dictionary*.⁴⁵ Kurokawa, famous Japanese architect, studied philosophy of symbiosis as the idea intending to recognize each holy ground one another.⁴⁶ Inoue, Nawata, and Katsuragi proposed conviviality that is one aspect of competitive symbiosis.⁴⁷ And I would like to propose cooperative symbiosis security. Cooperative symbiosis is pursued by a Japanese study group of Eastern philosophy.⁴⁸ Northeast Asian people can envisage regional community with the idea of Eastern origin. The idea of cooperative symbiosis is to overcome competitive symbiosis and to pursue symbiosis with cooperation.

Sixth, although it may sound too ambitious, I would like to see the creation of a supranational organization like the European Union (EU) in the region of Northeast Asia. Even if it is an idealistic view, we need a vision of the future. If we do not have any vision, human history will not make progress. I believe that there is a germinal possibility of international organization, as I have discussed in this paper. In the future, this germ may be trained up to an international organization. To create such an international organization, many existing organizations, such as KEDO, TCOG, and so on, should be linked. Then beyond the international organization, it may grow into a supranational organization. From this vision of a supranational organization, the problem of North Korea may be one of the matters that we should deal with. The problem of North Korea might indeed be an opportunity for creating such a supranational organization.

Acknowledgments

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Notes

1. Paper for International Seminar on “Northeast Asian Countries’ Perspective on Peace in the Korean Peninsula” at Institute for Peace Studies, Korea University, 2 May 2003.
My perspective in this paper is not necessarily the policy of the Japanese government but only a personal perspective of me as a Japanese researcher. My major area of study is the theory of international organizations, especially peace and security through international organizations. I would like to present my personal view for peace on the Korean Peninsula.
2. Of course, there are many problems between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, such as the problem of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visiting Yasukuni Shrine, the problem of the new Japanese junior high-school history textbook, and the problem of military prostitutes. Many of the frictions between the ROK and Japan were caused in the age of the Japanese Empire, which invaded East Asian countries.
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Appendix: Brief Notes on the International Academic Conference

“Northeast Asian Countries’ Perspectives on Peace in the Korean Peninsula”

Professor Sung-Hack Kang, who is Director of the Institute for Peace Studies (IPS) at Korea University, hosted an International Academic Conference entitled “Northeast Asian Countries’ Perspectives on Peace in the Korean Peninsula” on May 2, 2003. The conference aimed to explore a variety of Northeast Asian countries’ perspectives on peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, at a critical moment for the harmony and prosperity of Northeast Asia.

Opening Remarks by Sung-Hack Kang (Director, Institute for Peace Studies, Korea University)

Chairperson: Seo Hang Lee (Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security)

Paper Presenters:

Zhang Xiaoming (Professor, Beijing University)

“China’s Concerns about the Future of the Korean Peninsula”

Mariko Shoji (Professor, Keiai University)

“A Japanese Perspective: International Organizations for Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula”

Alexandr Minaev (Political Counselor, Embassy of Russia)

“Russia’s Role for the Peace Making on the Korean Peninsula”

Sung-Hack Kang (Director, Institute for Peace Studies)

“The United States on the Korean Peninsula: A Forest Fire-Fighter or An Arsonist?”

Discussants:

Taeho Kim (Senior China Analyst, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses)

Shinsuke J. Sugiyama (Minister, Embassy of Japan in Seoul)

Eunsook Chung (Senior Fellow, The Sejong Institute)

Changsu Kim (Director, U.S. Studies, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses)